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EW federal legislation allows depository institu-
tions to offer money market deposit accounts
(MMDAs)free of interest rate restrictions. The Cam-
St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 in-
structs the DepositoryInstitutions Deregulation Com-
mittee (DIDC) to authorize the new account not later
than 60 days after its enactment (October 15, 1982),
and requires that the account be “directly equivalent
to and competitive with money market mutual funds.”
In addition, it specifies that the account have no mini-
mum maturity and that it allow up to three preautho-
rized or automatic transfers and threetransfers tothird
parties (checks) per month)
In addition to authorizing this account beginning
December 14, 1982, the DIDC issued regulations
allowing a super-NOW account to he offered after
January 4, 1983; this account allows unlimited check-
ing, or third-party transfers, yet offers an unrestricted
interest rate. Both super-NOW and money market
deposit accounts require initial and minimum average
balances of at least $2,500. The primary difference
between them is that super-NOWs allow unlimited
checking and are counted as transaction accounts fin
reserve requirement purposes, while money market
deposit accounts have limited checking privileges and
are not classified as transaction accounts.
Aswith prior innovations such asthe development of
the money market mutual hind (MMMF), the savings
depositwith automatictransfer services (ATS), and the
negotiable order of withdrawal account (NOW), the
new deposits raise inportant questions about their
effects on monetary aggregate measures. Serious con-
cern has been expressed about the continued reliabil-
‘See U S. Congress, Carn—St. Cermain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, 97th Congress, 2d Session, September 6, 1982. In the
implementation of the bill, the DIDC interpreted the latter to
alloxv up to six transfers per month, including up to three checks
per month.
ity ofmonetary aggregates as economic indicators and
their usefulness for monetary policy.2 Some analysts
have concluded that Ml will he subject to large and
unpredictable changes that will adversely affect its
relationships with spending and inflation, while M2
will remain unaffected. As a result, it has been sug-
gested that the Federal Reserve should focus more
attention on M2 in the conduct of monetary policy.3
The analysis presented here indicates that these
concerns are exaggerated. New money marketdeposit
accounts will distort M2, not Ml. Super-NOW
accounts arenot likely to affect either aggregate. Since
MI and its interpretation are unlikely to be affected by
shifts to money market deposit accounts or super-
NOW accounts, it should remain as useful for the
conduct of monetary policy as it has been in the past.
THE NEW ACC )UNTS AND THE
MO.NETA.RY AGG.REG.ATES
Table 1 presents the definitions of Ml and M2and
their components as of November 1982, the month
‘Anexcellent reviewoftheconcerns raised byinnovations isthat by
John Xl. Berry. ‘The Fed’s Policy LeversAre Becoming Weaker.”
~AbusIi ington Post, Decemher 12, 1982. lIe indicates that sonic
policvmakers believe that recent andprospective innovations have
rendered XII “virtually meaningless in theshort ran,’’ amid that M2
is a more useful target, at least temporarily. See also Edward P.
Foldessev, “New Bank Accounts May Force Fed to End Experi-
ment in Monetarism, “ Wall StreetJournal. December 28, 1982.
‘A shift ofemphasis ims monetary policy’ that began in October 1962
was motivated by the same type ofargument. Then it was antici~
pated that the redemptions of All—S~ avers Certificates, especiallyin
October and November, would distort Mi hut not M2. Interest—
inglv, a yearearlier, theconcern with inflows to new All—Savers was
that they would lead to a surge in M2. See Daniel L. Thornton,
“The FOMC in 1981: Monetary Control in a Changing Financial
Environment,” tIns Reciew (April 1982), p. 20. The argument that
Mi growth was distorted upward at the end of 1982 (Inc to All—
Savers redemptions is not examined below, sincethe pace ofMi
growth in thelast three monthsof1962 was no larger thnnoccurred
from July to October 1982.
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Table 1
The Components of Ml and M2 as of November 1982
(billions of dollars)
Ml M2
Durrericy S131 6 Ml S 4746
Travelers cflecks 4 S Overnight lRPs 41 3
Demand deposits 238 Ci Overnight Euroco iar& 6 6
Othr checkable aeposts 100 5 Money mane: rick.?.’ funds 185 8
Say ngs deposits 362 2
S”iall I mc deposits 9224
54746 SL986
Repurchase agreements at a’ depository -islit,jtiorn rot seasortaily aecsled
Such deposmts al Gar’bbeaq brarobes &U S financial irsilumions not seasonally aolusted
~mnc,udes super NOW baiances las we.l as ATS sasiinus NOW arid credrt oiler share arall balances).
~ nioney rna’kot ~utualLines he d by inst tu’iors Or.y Qerera! purpose ard broker deale
balances are included not seaso’ia.y a~1usted
lnc’udc’s noney market deposit account oa~ances
before the introduction of MMDAs.4 MMDA bal-
ances, which are not transaction balances, are in-
cluded in M2, while super-NOW balances are in-
cluded in Ml, since they offer unlimited third-party
transfers, just as do demand deposits, ATS balances,
NOW deposits and credit union shame draft accounts.
The “Source ofShifts” Approach and
The impact of The New Accounts
A popular means ofassessing the effects ofthese new
accounts on the monetary aggregates canhe called the
“source of shifts” analysis, In this approach, one looks
atthe items intable 1 and determines the source of the
funds that are shifted into each ofthe new accounts. Of
course, it is possible that funds added to oneofthe new
accounts might have come from financial assets not
listed in table 1 and this possibility is discussed later.
To clarify the use ofthisparticular approach, however,
it is convenient to assume that funds shifted into the
new accounts come solely from other accounts showmi
‘on February i4, i983, the lloard of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System announced revisions in the monetary aggregates.
These revisions included two definitional changes br M2. First,
tax-exempt money nsarket mutual funds which previously had
been excluded from the aggregates were included on the same
basis as taxable MMMFs, Second, all IRAJKeough balances at
depository’ institutions and Xl MMFswere removed from M2. ‘Fhe
data used in this study do not incorporate these revisions, but the
empirical results should not be affected by them.
in table 1. The net effect fur each aggregate can he
fbund hv adding the balances in the new account and
changes in the balances of the sources of’ the funds.
The new money market deposit account is included
in M2. Consequently, shifts of funds fromn any other
component in table 1 to money mnarket deposit
accounts will leave M2 unchamiged; of course, shifts
from MI deposits to MMDAs xvill reduce Ml. Thus, if
total spending or CNP remains unchanged, shifts to
money mnarket deposit accounts from other eosnpo-
nents ofM2will not affect the velocity ofM2 (the ratio
ofCNPto M2), but thevelocity ofMl (the ratioofCNP
to Ml) will rise if the shifts to MMDAs are associated
with a decline in MI.
In the case of super-NOW accounts, shifts of funds
among Ml deposit components will leave both Ml and
M2totals unaffected. Iffunds includedin M2hut not in
Ml are shifted to super-NOW accounts, Ml will rise
while M2 again is unaffected.
The conclusion of this approach is that M2 will he
unaffected by the new accounts, hut that Ml could fall
or rise. As a result, Ml could he distorted and its
movemnents rendered meaningless during the period
of major shifts to these new accounts. This approach
indicates that it will have limited use as an indicator of
economic activity or a target for monetary policy. On
the other hand, since M2 is unaffected, it is argued that
its usefulness for policy is unchanged.
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Monetary Asset Portfolios and the Impact
ofthe \Teu’ Accounts
A hroader approach is to examine the cfkcts ofthese
new accounts ondesired holdings ofstocks ofmnonetary
assets. In this approach, the actual purchases or sales of
financial(or real) assets provide littleinformation about
the demnand for or supply of Ml. For exannple, when
individuals add to their non—transaction balances (i.e.,
increase their savings), they generally do soinitially by
reducing their transaction balances; that is, they use
currency or checkable deposits. In the “source of
shifts” approach, this initial action would he inter-
preted as a reduction in the demand for transaction
balances relative to other financial assets and, there-
fore, a reduction in Ml, with no change ineither M2or
economnic activity.
In a more general analysis, this conclusion is not
necessarily valid. Since countless individual transac-
tionstend tobe offset dailyby other transactionsby the
same or other individuals, the vast majority of these
transactions have little effect on financial markets or
thenation’s economic perfbrmnance. Only ifindividuals
change the share of their assets held as transaction
balances (money) vis a vis savings, or their average
money balances relative to income or spending, would
therebea meaningful changein economnic behavior. In
the examination ofthe new accounts helow, considera-
tions from this broader “portfolio approach” generally
reverse the “source ofshifts” conclusions; the portfolio
approach suggests that the new accounts will distort
M2 while leaving Ml virtually unaffected.
PROJECTED IMPACT OP MONEY
MARKET DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS
The money market deposit account was introduced
to allow financial institutions to compete directly for
deposits with money market mutual funds. The trans-
action services available with such accounts are lim-
ited, and are generally less than those currently avail-
able with money market niutual funds.
In addition to the sources listed in table 1, house-
holds and businesses could switch funds to MMDAs
from other asset holdings, including such financial
assets as U.S. savings bonds, Treasury bills or other
securities. Ifthis were to occur, M2 would rise.’ Such
‘The sameargument can be carried a step further hut isnot central
to the discussion here. The monetary aggregate M3 includes, in
addition to M2, largetime deposits, term repurchase agreements
andinstitutional moneymarket mutual find balances. Shifts from
reallocations in asset holdings are likely only if
MMDAs offer a new asset-holding opportunity. Prior
to MMDAs, however, asset holders could have held
MMMF balances. MMDAs changed the financial en-
vironment by allowing a federally-insured, MMMF-
like instrument to he held more comivenientlv at a local
depository institution. If the additional conveniemice
and/or insurance are important, M2 will he increased
by shifts to MMDAs, while Ml will be unaffected.
The only type ofshiftto MMDAs that could impinge
directly on Ml is a shift of deposits from Ml. Such a
shift is unlikely, however. MMDA balances do not
provide the transaction services offered by Ml compo-
nents and do not change the opportunities available
before MMDAs, other than the insurance and conve-
nience noted above.6 Asset holders could have chosen
to hold less Ml and more MMMF balances had their
higher yields been attractive compared with the lower
yield and transaction services of the Ml components.
The decision to hold Ml versus MMMF-type balances
should he little affected by the availability of tnoney
market deposit accounts; their yield and convenience
do not appear to offer a substantial improvement over
previously available opportunities.
Indirect Effects Produced by lJft’ferential
Reserve Requirements
Onealso mustconsider whether the shifts offunds to
the new money mnarket deposit accounts indirectly
affect the monetary aggregates. Different monetary
assets have different reserve requirements. Financial
innovations that lead to shifts ofhinds into a new asset
could affect the demand for reserves and, given a fixed
supply of reserves, indirectly affect the monetary
aggregates. Stmch indirect effects have an important
influemice on the monetary aggregates because they
the latter assets would raise directly M2 hut lease M3 unaffected.
Shifts from the broad spectrumu offinancial assets beyond M3, of
course, would raise X12 and M3 directly.
°Someanalysts may he concerned that XlXl DAaccounts will attract
some transaction halances that will continue to he used as transac-
tion balances hecause of the limited transaction features of these
accoumsts and their unlimited access in person, hy messenger orby
automatic teller machine, This concern appears to he unfounded;
nearlythe sameopportunity exists but was not usedwith MMMFs.
The sameconcern arosefor MMMFs, whichgenerally allosvunlim-
ited third party transactions, but often subject to a minimum size.
Surveys ofcheck usage of MMMF balances show that a relatively
insignificant share of these balances are held in accounts with a
turnover rate (ratioof the value ofall debits, including checks, to
average account balance) as high as that for NOW accounts. The
latter, in turn, is less than for demand deposits. Tlseturnover rate
on all money market mutual fund shares islower thanfor passbook
savings deposits at all financial institutions.
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influence whether the new accounts affect the various
money multipliers.’
Personal money market deposit accounts are not
subject to reserve requirements. Only nonpersonal
money market deposit accounts are subject to reserve
requirements, and these requiremnents are the same as
those on nonpersonal time and savings balances. The
deposit components ofMl, the nonpersonal time and
savings components of M2, and the personal time and
sayings components of M2 at member banks of the
Federal Reserve System are subject to reserve re-
quirements. To the extent that funds move from such
balances to MMDA balances, required reserves are
reduced. Given ami unchanged stock of reserves, de-
pository institutions would tend to develop excess re-
serves. To avoid the unnecessary non-interest-bearing
reserves, banks can purchase assets, including new
loans.
Although the effect on the demand for reserves
would be largest for slnfts to MMDAs from Ml deposit
components, such shifts are unlikely to occur. Even if
they should occur, the reduction in Ml would tend to
be offset exactly by the indirect increase in Ml arising
fromn the reserve demand effect. The net result is that
Ml would he unaffected and M2 would be raised —
just as ifthe shifts had comefrom financialassets not in
M2. If MMDA hinds should come from time and sav-
ings deposits, the indirect effects would serve to in-
crease both Ml and M2.8
If, as expected, money market deposit balances
come from MMMF balances or other non-reservable
components of M2, neither MI nor M2 will be
affected. Finally, if money market deposit accounts
arise from portfolio shifts fronì non-reservable assets
not in M2, M2 will increase, while Ml will be un-
affected.
initial Impact of MMDAs
Money market deposit accounts have shown
tremendous growth, due in part to the relatively high
initial interest rates that depository institutions have
offered on them. In the first four weeks, deposits in
these accounts grew to $160 billion, over 75 percent of
the total assets of money market mutual funds. The
latter lost about $25 billion in share balances from
December 8, 1982, to January 12, 1983. At commercial
banks, savings deposits fell by $11.7 billion over the
same period.
A large part of the increase in MMDAs apparently
came from shifts of fumids from tune deposits. At com-
mercial banks, small and large time deposits fell by
$50.6 billion from early December to early January.
Despite the massive flows of deposits to MMDAs, Ml
was little changed. For the fourweeks ending January
12, Ml averaged $479.5 billion, compared with $477.6
billion over the priorfourweeks.°Weekly information
for such a short period is severely limited and cannot
be regarded as more than suggestive evidence for the
effects ofMMDAs on the money supplyprocess and on
the interpretation of monetary aggregate movements,
however.
EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST:
11fF I\IPACI 01 \IONEI M%RKEI
\II1 1P41 FP\DS ON IHE \IONF1 tRI
ACCREGATES
Toassess thevarious consequences ofMM DA shifts,
the effects ofthe adventofmoney market mutualfunds
canbe examined. Chart 1 shows money marketmutual
fund balances (general purpose and broker dealer)
since the first quarter of 1974. These balances re-
mained relatively small until 1978.
°Sincethe latter period includes the first week in which super-
NOWs began, the absence of an apparent Ml effect might he
interpreted as a consequence ofoffsetting effects of MMDAs and
super-NOWs on MI. However, when averagesfor the threeweeks
up to and following the week ending December15, 1982 arc used,
MI is virtually unchanged, svhile MMDAs expanded by $119.8
billion.
‘See, for example, the discussion in Joho A. Tatomn and Richard
Lang, “Automatic Transfers and The MoneySupply Pm’ocess,”this
Review (February 1979). pp. 2—10; and John A. Tatom, ‘‘Recent
Financial Innovations: 1-laveThey Distorted the Meaning of MI?
this Review (April 1982), pp. 23—35.
tm
ln termsofa framework ofthe moneysupplyprocess that uses this
Bank’sadjusted monetary base, MI usually is affected by MMDA
shifts only ifthere is achange imi theadjusted monetary base, Inthe
absence of such a base change, M2 would rise hut MI would be
unaffected by theshift to MMDA balances. Theprimary exception
is in thecaseofachange in the public’sdesired holdingsoftime and
savings deposits at member hanks relative to total checkable de-
posits. The multiplier is not very sensitive to suchchanges, bowe~’—
er amid shiftsofsuch funds to MX-IMFbalances since l97Shave had
no appreciableeffects on theMl multiplier overthe pastfiveyears.
The correlationbetween monthly changes in the ratioof time and
savings deposits at member banks to the total checkable deposit
component of Mi amid changes in money mnarket mutual fund
balances (general purpose and brokerdealer) is0.003 for theperiod
January 1978 to Novemnher 1982. The correlation coefficient using
quarterly data is 0.l~. These coefficieots indicate that shifts to
MMMFs have not affected the Ml multiplier through such a
channel in anysystematic way. had such growth in NIXl MFs been
registered in member hank time and savings deposits, however,
the multiplier would have been lower and the adjusted monetary
base correspondingly higher. This will he the case with MMDAs;
shifts to MMDAs will have offsetting effects, raising the base and
lowering the mnultiplier during the transition.
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Chart 1
Money Market Mutual Fund Balances











MI%I3~IEEffects on the Growth of the
Monetary Aggregates
Since 1978, when MMMF balancesbegan toexpand
sharply, monthly changes in money market mutual
funds balances have been unrelated to monthly
changes in Ml (using not seasonally adjusted data for
both series); the correlation coefficient between these
changes from January 1978 to November 1982 is 0.03,
which indicates no relationship whatsoever between
them. Similarly, monthly changes in MMMF balances
are unrelated to monthly changesin currency, demand
deposits or other checkable deposits.° The history of
‘The same statistically insignificant relationships are obtained
when quarterly changes from the first quarter of1978 to the third
quarter of1982 are examoined. For example, thecorrelation eoeh
ficient between quarterly changes in MMMFs and in Xli is
—0.09.
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MMMF growth from 1978 to the present indicates that
Ml growth is unlikely to he affected by the growth of
MMDA-type assets.
On the other hand, monthly changes in MMMF
balances are correlated positively with monthly
changes in M2; the correlation coefficient is 0.27,
which indicates a statistically significant positive rela-
tionship at a 95 percent confidence level. ~ If all
MMMF growth were at the expense of other con p0-
nents of M2, this correlation would he zero. Thus, the
pattern of MMMF growth indicates that the M2 mea-
sure is increased significantly by the growth of
MMDA-type assets.
MM/tIE Effects on the Component Mix of
the i.Ionetam-y Aggregates
IfMMDA-typebalances arean attractivealternative
to holding deposit components of Ml, then the mnix of
Ml components should he related to the growth of
MMMFs. This could happen if people held relatively
largeidle checkable deposit balances that they wishto
switch to meet the high minimum balances required
by money market mutual funds and to obtain their
relatively higher yields. Because money market de-
posit accounts have a higher minimum balance
($2,500) than mnost money market mnutual f’unds, such
an effect could be important for MMDAs.
A measure of the desired mix of Ml components is
the currency ratio, the holdings ofcurrency relative to
total checkable deposits. If the introduction of
MMDAs causes a shift from checkable deposits,
whether ‘idle’’ or not, it should show up in a higher
currency ratio. In fhet, tlu~ correlation coefficient be-
tween monthly changes in the currency ratio and
monthly changes in MMMFs is negative, —0.21, hut
not statistically significant at a 95 percent confidence
level. For quarterly changes from the first quarter of
1978 to the third quarter of 1982, the coefficient is
—0.03, again negative but insignificant. Thus, the cur-
rency ratio has not been positively affected by the
growth of momiey market mutual fund balances, con-
firming the previous conclusion that NI 1 has not been
aflk~ctcdby growth in MMDA-tvpe assets.
Chart 2 prox’idles’ a partial indication of the likely
sources of growth in the new mnomicy market deposit
accounts. This chart looks at tile nontransaction com—
For qmmartcrlv data hum 1/1978 to [11/1982, this corm’clatioois 0.43,
which is unIv significant at a9 3percent comlfidcnc’c level. For
seasonally adjusted NI2 data, hi iwcver, the c:oclfic’ic mit is 0.478,
statistically significant at a9 5percent commfidcmmcc level.
ponents of M2, measured relative to the transaction
balance measure of mnoney, Ml. The ratio of the non-
Ml components of M2 to Ml is shown from 1/1959 to
111/1982, as well as the ratio computed without
MMMF balances in the numerator. The broad non-
transaction components measure generally rises over
the whole period. After 1978, however, the instru-
ments that exclude MMMFs decline sharply from
their prior trend. This indicates that the total of non-
transaction accounts in M2has exhibited a faster tremld
growth than Ml, whilethe growth in MMMF balances
has taken place, in part, at the expense of the other
previously existing non-transaction components of
M2.’2
MMM1 Effects on Measures of Velocity
Whether MMDAs affect the meaning of the mone-
tary aggregate measures is indicated by changes in
these aggregatesrelative to total spending or UN?. An
analysis of how the velocity of Ml (M2), the ratio of
UN? to NI 1 (M2), has been affected by the growth of
MMMF balances provides useful information regard-
ing this cjuestion.
The correlation coefficient between quarterly
changes in Ml velocity and quarterly changes in
MMMF balances from the first quarter of 1978 to the
third quarter of 1982, —0.15, shows no statistically
significant relationship betweemi Ml velocity and
MMMF balances. Forthe samneperiod, the correlation
coefficient forchanges in M2velocity is —0.46, which
indicates a statistically’significant negative relationship
between NIN!MF’ balances amid M2 velocity. ~ Since
1977, the velocity of M2 gemierallv has been pushed
down, or its grtnvth m’ate reduced, by the surge in
MMMFs. Thus, contrary to the ‘‘source ofshifts’’ siess’,
MMDA—tvpe assetshavedistorted the relationship he—
‘The correlation between mnonthlv chammgcs in NIN [XIF halamlces
amid the other m moo—MI (‘0111ponents of Xl 2 frummi Januam’v 1978 to
Novemhcr 1982 is —0.48, umsiogriot seasonally ad jmmstcd data, TIus
negative corrclatio m~ is statistically sigsi ificam it at the 95 perc’emi
level. For quarterly data Ii’omm~1/1978 to 111/1982. the same sigmfi—
cam mt negative rclatiumislup is o hscm’vccl: the cmirrclation c’oeliiciemit
is —0.57.
13
N’19 velocity rose sharply frumo 1977 to 1980. amid imi late 1980 and
early 1981. despite the risc in NI NI XI Fs. The cmmiusuallv strong
gm’owth pm’ohahly is associated with tIme sharp rise imi interest rates
dtmrimlg thcse’pcm’iods. ‘l’hc velocityofNl2 is strongly amid positively
corm’clatcd with intcrest ratt’s, The correlat iomi coelhciemit for
cthaoges im ~ NI2 velocity and qmmarterl v chami ges in tlie 3—mom mth
im’easmsm’y bill rate is 0.35 fromu 11/1959 to 111/1982, while that [hr
Xli velocity is 0. 13. The Ibromer is statistically sigmiificamit at a9 5
pcrccmlt cummfideumcc level, while the lalter is out, A recent sharp
dccli Ic in NI 2 velocity in 1982, 1mm part. m’ellccts tIme dcclin ei n
imltcrcst rates,
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tween M2 and spending, hut not between NIl and
spending.
Summary of Likely MMDA Effects
flie simnple correlation evidence fi’om the explosion
of money’ market mnutual fund balances over the past
five years does not support the hypothesis that Ml will
he reduced because of shifts from Ml compomments to
the new MMDA accounts. The evidence associated
with the rapid growth of Ni NiNI F balances in the past
five years indicates that the Ml measure will likely he
unaflk~ctedby MMDA shifts, while M2 will rise. In
adclitiomi, the es’idence indicates that growth in
MMDA-type balances, like NiM~~ IF halances, will re-
duce the yelocity of M2, hut is not likely to afièct Ml
velocity.
THE PROJECTED IMPACT OF’
SUFEB-NOWS
The imitroduction ofstmper—NOW accounts simnilarly
is not without precedent. Super-NOWs are higher-
yielding NOW accounts, subject to the same reserve
requirements, hut with a substantial initial amid mini—
mum average balance of 82,500 and, in mnany cases,
substantial fees.
NOW accounts, winch were permitted natiommwide
heginmnng in January 1981, were included in other
checkable deposits. Previously, other checkable de-
posits were principally Al’S halammces nationwide and
NOW account balances in New England, Ness’ York
amidNew Jersey. Chart 3 shows the patternofgrowth of
other checkable deposits from 1/1974 to the present;
they (lid not grow suhstamitiailv until ATS accounts
were permitted in IV/l978. In December 1980, 9.1
percent of total checkable deposits svere held in other
checkable deposits (i.e., checkable deposits otherthan
demand deposits). During the first sear of miationwicle
NOW accounts (through December 1981). other
eheekahle deposits sm.mrged to 24.6 percent of total
checkable deposits. By November 1982, other check-
able deposits had risen further, to 29.7 percent of total
checkable deposits.
The surge in NOW accounts was limnited by restric—
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The primary concern over super-NOWs is not re-
lated to shifts from existing NOW accounts, however.
Instead, as was the case when nationwide NOW
accounts were introduced, the commcern is that non-
transaction balances will shift into the new accounts,
distorting the Nil measure. By some estimates, only
about 70to 75 percent ofnew other checkable deposits
in 1981 came from other transaction balances. Conse-
quently, it was thought that as much as 25to30 percent
ofother checkable deposits represented adistortion of
the aggm’egates, especially overstating the growth of
the “true” transaction balance component of Nil.
The problem with such estimates, as explained ear-
lier, is that the source of the initial hinds for a new
account may he irrelevant. Previous studies of the
effect of NOWs on the money supply process and on
the relationship of Ml to economic performance have
shown that shifts to NOW accounts did not distort
measured Ml, nor damage its usefulness as an indica-
tor for total spending, inflation or monetary policy
1975 mm mm mns mg7q 1980 mcai mtsi developments. 14 ‘I’here is no reason to believe that
super-NOW accounts will have different effects from
those previously observed with NOW accounts.
accounts and by thelack ofincentives for many deposi-
tors. Under existing regulations, the first restriction
applies to super-NOW accounts, although the DIDC
has asked for public comment on allowing businesses
to hold the new super-NOW account. The second
restriction, limited incentives, will he even more im-
portant with the super-NOW account than the NOW,
because of the relatively high minimum balance re-
quirement.
An individual considering holding a super-NOW
account must weigh the higher yield on existing aver-
age balances currently held in a NOW account against
the interest penalty borne on funds that would haveto
be shifted from higher yielding assets to meet the
increased minimum balance requirements. Because
super-NOW accounts, unlike MMDA or MMMF
accounts, are subject to reserve requirements ofabout
12 percent, the interest rate paid on super-NOW
accounts is likely to be lower than that on MMMFs or
MMDAs by about 12 percent ofeurrent MMMF rates.
In November 1982, this difference was about 1 per-
centage point; for a range ofMMMF rates of6 percent
to 16 percent. this differential or penalty would vary
from 72 to 192 basis points. These are clearly signifi-
cant spreads for otherwise similar assets. Thtis, only
individuals already holding relatively large checkable
deposits, for example, those holding more than $2,500
onaverage, arelikely tohave an incentive to switch to a
super-NOW account.
Additional Ecidence on the Effects of
NOW Accounts
Some additional evidence bearing on the likely im-
pact ofsuper-NOWs canbe obtained by lookingat the
correlation between quarterly changes in other check-
able deposits simmee the introduction of ATS accounts
(IV/1978) and certain factors that influence the link
between monetary policy actions and Ml. The factors
examined should be affected if desired portfolio hold-
ings are altered by shifts to other checkable deposits
such as super-NOWs.
One such factor is the currency ratio. The currency
ratio shoumld decline ifthe demand for total checkable
deposits were increased relative to that for currency to
meet minimum balance requirements or because the
return on other checkabledeposits had increased. The
correlation coefficient for changes in other checkable
deposits and changes in the currency ratio from IV/
1978 to 111/1982 is —0.27 using seasonally adjusted
data, and 0.15 using not seasonally adjusted data;
i
4
SeeTatom, “Recent Financial Iminovatiuns: HaveThey Distorted
the Meatong ofMl?”; ScottE. Heimi, “Short-Run MooeyGrowth
Volatility: Evidence of Mishelmaving Money Demand?’ this Re-
view (June/July 1982), pp. 27—36; and Jerry Jordan, “Financial
Innovation amid Monetary Policy,” in Federal Reserve BankofSt.
Louis, Financial Innovations: Their mmpact on Monetary Policy
and Financial Mark-eta, Proceedings of a Conference held at St.
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neither is statistically significant. Correlation coeffi-
cients for quarterly changes in other checkable de-
posits and quarterly changes in the ratios of commer-
cial bank (and all depository institutions) small (and
total) time and savings deposits to total checkable de-
posits also fail toshow any statistically significant nega-
tive relationships that nnght be expected due to shifts
of nontransaction balances to measured transaction
balances. 15
Finally, if the growth of other checkable deposits
represented such non-transaction balances, the veloc-
ity of Ml would be negatively and significantly corm’e-
lated withthe growth ofother checkable deposits. The
correlation coefficient for quarterly changes in Ml
velocity and quarterly changes in other checkable de-




The choice between monetary aggregate targets is
influenced by both the controllability ofthe aggregate
amid the stability of its relationship to measures ofeco-
nomic perfbrmance, especiallytotal spending orGNP.
Typically, on both criteria, Ml is superior to other
aggregates in statistical examinations of the historical
record.17
Despite this evidence, there is widespread concern
that recent financial innovations have affected the
meaning or controllability of Nil and that, during
periods of such “turbulence,” M2 is a better policy
target than Ml. ~ What is somnetimes mnissed indiscus-
“The correlation coefficient for quarterly changes in the ratio of
member bank total time and savings deposits to total checkable
deposits, miot seasonally adjusted, and quarterly changes imi other
checkabledeposits, not seasonally adjusted, is0.15, fur time period
simmce IV/1978; this also is miutstatistically significant. The Ml amid
M2 multipliers have heen unaffected hy changes in other check-
able deposits.
ui.he growth of otlmer checkable deposits snch as super-NOW
halances also is uncorrclated with M2 velocity movemnemmts, The
correlation coefficient between quarterly changes imm other check-
abledeposits and M2 velocity is0.18 forthe period fronm the fosmrth
quarter of 1978 tu the third quarter of 1982.
tm7
See II. W. Hater, “Much Ado About M2,”this Review’ (October
1981), pp. 13—18; and Keith 11. Carlson and Scott E. Heimi,
Mommetary Aggregates as Monetary Indicatom’s,” this Review
(November 1980), pp. 12—21.
1
’Berry, “The Fed’s Policy Levers.” provides this conclusion but
alsonotes, however, that the velocity ofboth MI and M2 dropped
in 1982, raising sonic doubt about the usefulness ofeither aggre-
gate as a target fur monetar policy. A decline in velocity, abso-
lutely or relative to trend, is not ummusunl in a recession, however,
since measured income dechimmes relative to permanent incnnmc,
See, fur examuple, Milton Friednmami, “The Quantity Theory of
ci,’~”4
Growth Rates of GNP and M2
me
sions of the relative merits of M2and Ml, however, is
that the 1980 redefinitions ofthe aggregates changed
the M2measure substantially while changing Ml only
moderately. The substantial difference between the
old and current M2measures arises from the inclusion
ofsome financial assets that are comnpetitive with time
and savings deposits in the current definition of M2,
especially money market mutual funds, tO
The Relationship Between the Monetaru
Aggregates and GIVE
Movements in M2 have been dominated by move-
merits in money market mutual fund balances for
several years. As a result, the usefulness of M2 as an
indicator of economic performance has been reduced
substantially. Chart 4 shows the annual growth rates of
M2 and GNP for four-quarter periods since the first
qumarter of 1977. Empirical assessment of the rela-
tionship ofM2and CNPgrowth affirmthe relationship
Mommey — A Restatemiment,” in Milton Friedniami. ed, , Studies in
The Quantity Theun, of Money (University of Chicago Press,
1956), especiall’,’ pp. 18—19. The correlation coefficiemit for
quarterly velocity chammgcs and unemployment rate changes is
—0.35 and —0.41 fur Ml and M2, respectively, from 111/If 59 to
111/1982. Bothare strongly statistically significantand indicate the
miegative effect ofrecessions on velocity.
tmm
See R. ‘iV. Hater, “The New Monetary Aggregates,” this Review
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charm
Fou,-qo,,i,, ‘at’s at ci,,, g,.
indicated in the chart. There is no correlation hetween
the growth rates of M2 arid CNP ov’er the whole five—
year period (the correlatiomi coefficient is 0.04); over
the past three years (1/1979 to tlI/l982), howeyer. the
correlation coefficient ( — 0.61) is significantly’ negative
at a 95 percent confidence level.20
20
Experimueuts with reduced—fonsm regrcssiumm cqimat ii mis bear out
lie iircakdowmm as ‘yell, Hafer, ‘‘ M nell Ado Aboimt Ni2. presents
eq uatiomi5 II simmg Ml or NI 2 growl Ii that i mxdicatc the s Imperil)m’itv of
Ni I . Wli emm a samnplc pcm’iud of 11/1961 to 1\’/l 977 is extemided to
111/1982. a standard Cimuw test imidicates that time stability of time
Nm2—GNP m’elatiommsbip breaks dowo, Expcm’imnemits with time con—
strmiimme~ICN P equation presented in the appendix to J(lbii A.
i’atumo. ‘‘Energy Prices and Short— Run Ec’um momimic Pcrformim;ui cc,’
this Review (Jammnary 1981), pp. 3—17. substitutimmg M2 fur NI I yield
tin’ result tlmat at a 99
1
x,reemmt commfidcmmcd’ icvei. the equatiumm ~vitim
NI 1 isstable after 1977, but that with NI 2 is mmot. Simmm u latmumi5 ofthe
IV/l977 equatiomi yield systematic andl relatively large ummdcm’csti—
mmmatcs of GNP growtim until 1/1981. thcmm systematic amid large
overestimates of GN P growth to 111/1982. Of (lie 19 quarters
sOmm ulatcd. six of die crru]’s ale greater thami twice the s tammdard
error ul time eq smationcstimimated mmd the root mmi tami sqImarum erm’ur (if
time estimmiates is 5.10 pcrcemmt, commitiared with aim imi—samnple stamm—
(lard erm’ur of 2.80 mier(’cmit,
in comitrast, the growth rate of GNP is highly’ amid
sigmfieantly positivel~’related to the growth rate of
Ml, both for tIme entire five—year period (the correla-
tion coefficient is 0.67), and for the 1/1979 to 111/1982
suhperiod (the correlation coefficiemit is 0.58)21
Th.e ControllaLility of Monetary Aggregates-
The problem with using Nl2 as an indicator of eco-
nomic pem-formammce is reflected in the breakdown of
the relationship hetweemi Ml and M2.22 Chart 5 show’s
21 1”nr tImt’ cumivemmtium mal (‘01itrastimig view, see Berm”,’, ‘‘Tlie Fed’s
Pill ic’’ I ~evers ‘‘ lie miutcs that the rclatiu mish ii) of NI2 to C N’ P has
I cemi ‘‘q mute stable amid tm’endless with, say a 10 pereemit imlcreasd’ i mi
N’12, mmlmimost always assueiated with aliou t a 10 percent increase imi
2
TimeIireakdowmi imi tbe positive and strumig rd athamslmip for time past
several years is not mmmiii m’ecedem m ted, Tim crc “as 110 reiatiummsimi1i
duriimg 1962—66 when N12 growth cbammged little, bum Nil ammd CNP
growth accelerated slmarpl ‘.‘: time correI mitnimi coeflicie mit fur Ni2 and
CNP growth uyer this period is 0.24, not statistically sigoificammt at
emil mvemm tiumiai levels.
Growth Rates of Mi and M2
Percemmt Percent
16 16
1961 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 14 75 16 77 78 19 80 81 1982
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6.8
Ramia at am a,d 1(2 ma $5, Adj~stedMa,ema,y Base.
tIme anmmual growth rate of NIl and M2 for four—quarter
periods simice 1960. Ummtil 1977, the growth rates are
higimly’ positively’correlated (the correlation coefficient
is 0.65)23 Tlmis relationship disappeam’s after 1976; the
correlation over tIme period 1/1977 to 111/1982 drops to
0.23, which imiclicates time absence of a statistically
meaningful relationship.
This evidemice pm’ovides somne immsight into the issue of
the relative commtrollahility of time mnonetaryaggregates;
this issrme is crucial in time choice of a momietar~’policy
target. The cemitral hank dim’ectly controls only its owmm
portfolio, so it can determine pm’ecisehr’ only the mone—
tan’ base. If tIme m’elationship hetweemi time’ base and
m’normetaryaggm’egates is unstahie or even bm.tghlv sari—
able, the achmevemnent of policy oh1ectives is tnore
difficult. 1mm thiscase, the difficultywould hehittimmg time
amKenmmetlm C. Froewiss. F’iuanew I Market Fe e.spec(ice, Cumldman—
Sacbs Ecouommmics (Decenmbem’ 1982). p. 3. slmuws that time growtlm imm
Nil plums time savings comulmomients of N’12, has be’n imiversclyrelated
to timat ofthe me rmmaimmder umf N 12 simmee immid —1978. II eargues that tlmi
is e’’ideumce that NI2 is mm longer mi rd lithIum guide to mtmummetam’v
policy.
target successfully. M2 is subject to substantially high-
er comitrol errors thian M 1.24 Over the past several
years, this has been apparemit imm the dispam’ate helmavior
of Nil and M2.
Furtlmer evidemmce 0mm this issue is available from the
ammalvsis of the ratios of Ml and M2 to the adjusted
momietary liase, the Ml and M2 mnrmltipliers. These
mnmmltipiiers are shiowmm imi chart 6 fromn 1/1959 to 111/
21 It slmuumid be muted, Imm wever, tlmat iii slmurt —ru mm cummtm’oh expe rm—
mae its, time error dispersiomm 5tatistics Fur eu rm’emmt—i mmui m tim aggregate
prIm)ectiu mis hmtve I ieemm lunmmd to be Sm maIler fur Ni 2 tim aim I’umr NI I
mmsi mmg imotlm judgimuem mtal Forecasts am md tIme Rmmsehe’ —Jolmamm mmc’s mm multi—
Imlier Fum’ecmmstimmg ‘mm etlmod, See F) mlvi(I Li mmdsea’, et mm!, , ‘‘Ni um metadv
Control Eximcriemmce U idler The New Operating Prucednres. ‘‘ in
l3oard of Covermmurs of the Federal Reserve Systemmi. Federal
Reserve Staff Study.N’euv ,%lonetary Goutnil Proeeduzres I Febm’u—
ary 1981). PP 1—102.
TIme eommelmmsiomm imm the text is Imased omm quarterly estimmmates ,mf time
relatiummslmip hetweemm ummommetarv grumwtim rates amid time gru~vtlmrate
of time adjusted mmmommetary base, suclm as timose imm Jolmmm A. Tatummm,
“Niommey Smock Cummtroh UnderAltcrmmatiye Definitiomms of Niummey,
timis Recieuc (Novemnber 1979), Imp. 3—4); or I lafer, “Nimmcim Ado
Ahmommt NI 2,” u’lmem’e tIme stammdard error of aggm’cgates is lm iglmerfor
N12 tlmamm for NI!.
ci,,,’ 6
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1982. The earlier analysis indicatesthat NOWs didnot
affect the components of the Ml or M2 mnultiphier,
while the growth ofMMDA-type assets affected only
M2. A direct correlation analysis of the multipliers
bears out these findings. The correlation coefficient
between quarterly changes in the M2 multiplier arid
quarterly changes in MMMF balances simice 1/1978 is
strongly and significantly positive (0.82); changes in
the Ml multiplier, on the other hand, are unrelated to
movements in MMMFs (the correlation coefficient for
the same period is 0.12). Changes in other checkable
depositshave had no significant effecton either the Ml
or M2multiplier overthe same period; the correlation
coefficient equals 0.23 and 0.38, respectively.2°
Summary
Based on the evidence above, it appears likely that
the growth of money mnarket deposit accounts will
complicate efforts to control M2. The new accounts
will tend to raise the M2multiplier and reduce the M2
velocity, making M2 more difficult to control and to
interpret for policy purposes.
The new accounts do not appear to pose a problem
forMl. Its controllability andits relationship tospend-
ing are not likely to be affected by the changes accord-
ing to the evidence from similar recent institutional
changes.
CONCLUSIO].T
Strong concern has been expressed that mmewly arm-
thorized financial instruments at depository immstitu-
tionms will substantiallyalter NIl, thus reducing itsuse-
fulness as a target for commducting nmonetary policy. In
particular, the current commcern is that Ml willbe either
pushed upward by additions ofidle or non-transaction
balances to meet the higher minimnumforsuper-NOW
accounts, or puslmed downward by shifts of idle or
non-transaction balances from demand and NOW de-
251’he N12 mmmltiplier is mmegativelv related to mnuvemmme,mts in short—
term interest rates, Fronm 1/1978 to 111/1982. thecurrciation cuef-
ficiemmt imetweetmchanges inthe M2 mmmultiplier and those (ifthe4- tim
6-muummthm eommnercial paper rate is —0.47. TIme Nil multiplier is
not statistically correlated with clmanges in mates,
posits to MMDAs. Since such shifting is primarily
between assets within the M2 measure, it has been
widelyasserted that the shifts do not affect the measure
of M2and, by implication, will not distort its nmeaning
or usefulness for the conduct of monetary policy.
A broaderview ofthemoney supply process reaches
the opposite conclusions. The newly created mnoney
market deposit accounts are non-reservable deposits
withlimited transaction services andare quite simnilar,
in practice as well as in legislative inmtent, to mnoney
niarket mutual funds. The principal differences are
federal insurance and geographic eommvenience. Simi-
larly, super-NOW accounts are virtually identical to
NOW accounts, except that a $2,500minimum balance
is required by law and the instrument is free of rate
regrmlation.
Money market mnutual fummd-type assets, like money
mnarket deposit accounts, have no effect on Ml or its
velocity. Increases in such assets do tend to raise M2,
however, and to reduce its velocity. Super-NOWs are
similar to other checkable deposits arid are unlikely to
affect Ml or M2 measures or their relationships to
spending. In principle, the higher yields on super-
NOWs comnpared with other transaction balances
could lower currency demand relative to total transac-
tion deposits, thereby increasing both the demand for
Ml and its multiplier. The evidenmce from the introduc-
tion of ATS and, later, NOW accounts provides no
support for this conjecture, however.
Finally, it does not appear tlmat M2 is hikely to be
superior to Ml as a target for conducting monetary
policy. The conventional view that the M2-GNP rela-
tionship is both statistically significant ammd stable has
not been supported by the experiemmce over the past
several years.2°
26
Tlme argmimemmt here is not that nmomietary policy eatmimot be comm—
dumcted successfrmhiy using aim N’12 targeting procedure. lime cvi-
deuce cited aimove ommiy shows that NiNi HA accounts are likely to
raise N’12 growth relative to mummetan’ policy measures like the
adjmmsted mommetary base. and relative to spendimmg. Coumtimmuous
mmmuinitoririg of time cmfi’cctof mmew aeeou,mts on Ni2, as well assuccess-
ful monitorimmg of the effect of interest mate uaovernenti 0mm the
sup jmiv and demnammdfor M2, in principle, could allow movements
imm the M2 tam’get range that would he compatible with the attaimm-
rmmemmt of policy objectives.
16